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BOOK REVIEW 
AN EXAMINATION OF MAINE’S PUBLIC BEACH 
ACCESS 
MAINE’S BEACHES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY: THE BELL CASES MUST BE 
REEXAMINED. By Orlando E. Delogu. Standish, Me.: Tower Publishing. 
2017. Pp. xv, 268. $24.95. 
Reviewed by Ariel A. Hampton1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
People frequently enjoy access to public resources when they engage 
in activities such as walking along the beach, picnicking, or sunbathing. 
Often, people do not realize that many of the resources that the public 
relies upon can be taken away through privatization. While people have 
long considered rights to certain resources, such as air and water, to be 
guaranteed, there is now an element of uncertainty to these access rights. 
It is not until access is diminished that the public realizes that these 
resources and the access to them cannot be taken for granted. This 
especially rings true in the State of Maine, where two Supreme Judicial 
Court decisions have limited the public’s right to access beaches through 
the intertidal zone.2 This Review details the public use rights and Professor 
Orlando E. Delogu’s analysis of precedent that addresses why most of the 
intertidal lands should be held in trust for the public.3 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The term jus publicum refers to the public’s right to use certain 
resources, such as water and air but also shorelines and harbors.4 There is 
a long tradition of preserving these necessary features of human life and 
                                            
 1.  J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maine School of Law. 
 2.  See Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 
A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
 3.  ORLANDO E. DELOGU, MAINE’S BEACHES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY: THE BELL CASES 
MUST BE REEXAMINED 8 (2017). 
 4.  Id. at x. 
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society as being “incapable of [being held under] private ownership.”5 
Nevertheless, this tradition came under fire through the 1641-1647 
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance.6 
A district of Massachusetts since colonial times, Maine became a state 
in 1820.7 This newly formed State of Maine had the right to create its own 
laws under the equal footing doctrine;8 however, prior to Maine entering 
the Union, Massachusetts had a Colonial Ordinance.9 This Ordinance 
ceded the title of intertidal lands to the upland property owners despite the 
fact that this portion of the Ordinance was only intended to relinquish the 
title for the necessity of the commercial shipping industry.10 This act of 
cession meant private property owners could consider some uses of the 
intertidal zone by the public as a trespass, thus limiting public access.11 
III. ANALYSIS 
Since the late 1980s, private landowners held title to the State of 
Maine’s intertidal land.12 According to Delogu, this is the result of the 
faulty judicial reasoning in two Maine Supreme Judicial Court (“Law 
Court”) cases: Bell v. Town of Wells (Me. 1986) and Bell v. Town of Wells 
(Me. 1989) (“the Bell cases”).13 The upland property owners in these cases 
believed the Town of Wells to be complicit in allowing members of the 
public to continuously trespass on their property.14 The owners argued that 
they held title to the intertidal lands via the Colonial Ordinance.15 While 
the property owners did not fare well in the trial court, they received a 
favorable decision on appeal to the Law Court.16 Accordingly, as a result 
                                            
 5.  Id. This tradition spans from Roman codes to English common law to the present. 
Id. at 43-45. 
 6.  See id. at x, 9. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 223-24. The equal footing doctrine is read into the United States’ Constitution 
under Article IV, section 3. Id. at 224. 
 9.  Id. at 36-37 n.22. 
 10.  See id. at xi, 124 n.2. The reasoning behind the cession of title for the intertidal 
lands is not expressly given within the Colonial Ordinance nor was a reason given for the 
broad extension to relinquish all of the intertidal lands to private owners as a “unilateral 
gift” rather than just the land necessary for commercial shipping. Id. at xi, 24. 
 11.  See id. at 1-2. 
 12.  Id. at 8, 15. 
 13.  Id. at ix, 9. 
 14.  Id. at 1-2. The municipal actions that plaintiffs took issue with included the Town 
providing transport to the beach area and the employment of lifeguards. Id. at 1. 
 15.  Id. at 1. 
 16.  Id. at 7, 9. 
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of the Bell cases, the Court determined that the upland property owners in 
the State of Maine held the adjacent intertidal land title in fee simple and 
that the public’s right to use these intertidal lands was limited to fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.17   
Much of Delogu’s book is an analysis of the Bell cases and an 
explanation of why he believes they were wrongly decided.18 He primarily 
relies on jus publicum principles as well as the United States Supreme 
Court case Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois. In Illinois 
Central, the Court revoked the title of the submerged land in Chicago 
Harbor from the railroad company in order to return the title back to the 
government.19 The Court determined that the government is incapable of 
transferring title to the railroad company because this transfer would result 
in a significant impairment of the public interest.20 In Maine, where the 
Law Court’s interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance seemingly grants a 
unilateral gift to all upland property owners without taking into account 
the public interest outside of the enumerated public use rights, finding a 
significant impairment of the public interest is critical.21 
Delogu refers to five guiding principles developed from Maine case 
law concerning the appropriateness of reviewing cases on a stare decisis 
basis.22 These guiding principles consider the fairness of the decision, 
whether the context under which the decision was made has changed, what 
role the court had in the creation of the decision, what decisions the 
legislature has made regarding said decision, and whether the court is able 
to avoid harsh impacts for those who have relied upon the decision.23 
Delogu makes it clear that it is insufficient to simply expand the public use 
rights that were narrowly construed in the Bell cases.24 Instead, he 
advocates for the necessity of revocation.25 Delogu’s solution—that the 
State revoke the title of the intertidal property from private owners—
                                            
 17.  Id. at 5, 8. This narrow reading of the public use rights is particularly odd because 
even at the time of the Ordinance’s adoption people engaged in uses like grazing and lateral 
passage that the drafters did not expressly enumerate. Id. at 5. Also, because the 
Massachusetts Bay Colonial Ordinance was effectively “annulled,” the conveyance 
continued by “judicial adoption.” Id. at 124 n.2. 
 18.  Id. at ix. 
 19.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 463-64 (1892). 
 20.  Id. at 455-56. 
 21.  See Delogu, supra note 3, at xi. 
 22.  Id. at 23. 
 23.  Id. at 23-30. 
 24.  Id. at 33. 
 25.  Id.  
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would result in the state holding the land in trust for the public with the 
limited exception for commercial shipping.26   
IV. EVALUATION 
Delogu provides an extensive analysis surrounding the historical 
context of the issue regarding intertidal land through the principle of jus 
publicum as well as the Colonial Ordinance itself. Delogu’s historical 
reading of the Colonial Ordinance seems appropriate given the text and 
the later application of the text do not speak fully to the intentions of its 
drafters and rather represents a past that does not necessarily suit people 
of today.27 Delogu also makes a compelling argument concerning the 
applicability of Massachusetts law to the State of Maine. It certainly seems 
strange that Massachusetts law would dictate Maine law as if the State of 
Maine is still subservient to Massachusetts as it was prior to 1820. 
However, Delogu’s analysis does not dive into the concomitant setting 
in which the court found itself and does not explicitly address the 
underlying intentions of the Law Court in the Bell decisions. Rather, 
Delogu determines that the majority’s conclusions are facially 
erroneous.28 Delogu characterizes the Court’s analysis of the material 
facts in both Bell cases as negligent and contends the Court performed a 
superficial examination of the material facts and relied on tangentially 
related cases while ignoring more relevant cases such as Illinois Central.29 
A more robust consideration of the Law Court’s reasoning in the Bell cases 
                                            
 26.  Id. at 15, 25. The limited exception for commercial shipping would apply only 
when the owner needs the title to the intertidal land for purposes of navigation and actually 
fills the intertidal land for such a purpose. Id. The other exceptions are purposes authorized 
by statute that convey a public benefit. Id. at 243 n.1. 
 27.  See id. at 127 n.52. 
 28.  See id. at 23-34. 
 29.  See id. at 10, 122. The opinions of the Law Court in the legal analysis of Bell II 
suggest that the Law Court in the McGarvey case found fault with the prior court’s analysis 
to some extent as well. Id. at 240, 244 n.23. One could argue that the grant of intertidal 
land to the upland owners was not for the sake of public use and, therefore, no implied 
condition of revocability existed once the grantee fails to stay in keeping with the purpose 
of the grant. See id. at 18-19 n.34, 65-66, 117. The characterization of the grant as a 
defeasible estate or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent seems to rely at least in 
part on the grant being for a public purpose. See id. at 63-64, 66, 75 n.19. Perhaps, the Law 
Court in the Bell cases recognized there was no public purpose being furthered by the 
unqualified grant of all the intertidal land, much of which could not be used for wharfing 
purposes anyway, to the upland owners and thought it unnecessary to reference Illinois 
Central. See id. at 69. 
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could strengthen Delogu’s argument and improve the prospects of 
overturning the Bell decisions, which is his ultimate goal. 
Furthermore, Delogu touched only briefly on the importance of Maine 
retaining the title of the intertidal lands for the protection of such a 
vulnerable ecosystem.30 While the environmental issue is not the focus of 
the book, it is certainly one of substantial public interest to the State and 
could bolster the argument that the Bell precedent is bad for Maine. By 
limiting the analysis to a primarily historical public use argument and legal 
precedent, Delogu misses the opportunity to broaden the argument to 
include the public interest aspect that is crucial in Illinois Central.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, Maine’s Beaches Are Public Property provides exhaustive 
research into the history of ancient and recent law concerning intertidal 
lands. Delogu provides a thorough analysis of the Colonial Ordinance and 
the principle of jus publicum. However, the analysis may have benefited 
from a deeper dive into the Law Court’s underlying intentions and 
reasoning and thus provide further insight into the Court’s potential 
distinction between the Bell cases and Illinois Central. Delogu’s analysis 
relies heavily on a public access argument while his true desire appears to 
be for the State to have title to most of the intertidal lands and thus the 
lands be held in trust for the public. Regardless of the emphasis, Professor 
Delogu makes a forceful and compelling case for the reversal of the Bell 
cases.  
 
                                            
 30.  Id. at 238. 
